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Abstract
By  exporting,  firms  sell  in  markets  whose  the  business  cycles  are  not  perfectly
correlated and so can be expected to have more stable cash flows. If companies are liquidity
constrained, this stability of cash flows can provide exporters with certain advantages over
firms that operate solely in a domestic market. For instance, under the existence of liquidity
constraints, more stable cash flows should foster more stable capital investments. Moreover,
the  expectation  of  more  stable  future  cash  flows  and  the  information  signal  from
commencing exporting can lessen the severity of liquidity constraints for exporters compared
to non-exporters. We test these arguments by examining a stratified representative sample of
the Spanish manufacturing sector from 1990 to 1998. Our results suggest that exporters’ cash
flows and capital investments are more stable than non-exporters’. Moreover, we find that
liquidity constraints are less binding for exporters than for non-exporters. The richness of our
data allows us to examine alternative explanations for the results we present. We conclude by
discussing the strategic implications of our findings for firms.
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I. Introduction
Recent  studies  provide  mounting  evidence  that  the  correlation  between  firm
productivity  and  exporting  is  driven  by  productive  firms  becoming  exporters  and  not  by
exporters increasing their productivity. This evidence is based on data from the United States
(Bernard and Jensen, 1999), Taiwan and Korea (Aw and Huang, 1995), Colombia, Mexico,
and Morocco (Clerides, Lach and Tybout 1998), and Spain (Delgado, Fariñas and Ruano,
1999).  The  inference  from  these  findings  is  that  exporting  is  an  outcome  of  firm
characteristics  in  addition  to  environmental  conditions  such  as  exchange  rates  and  trade
policy.
We expect that exporting is more than just an outcome because exporting can have
an important effect on firm behavior. In particular, we argue that exporters will be better able
to make strategic investments like capital expenditures compared to non-exporters. Exporters
enjoy diversification benefits with respect to their cash flows if economic activity in the
markets in which they sell is not perfectly correlated. This stabilization of sales has long been
recognized in the internationalization literature and has been suggested as an advantage of
engaging in international activity (e.g., Hirsh and Lev, 1970). 
If information asymmetries exist, external financial markets will not be as efficient
as  internal  financial  markets  and  firm  investment  decisions  can  become  constrained  by
internal cash flow. This is referred to as the existence of liquidity constraints (e.g., Fazzari,
Hubbard, and Petersen 1988). The diversification benefit of selling in multiple nations should
provide an exporter with more stable cash flows compared to a similar firm operating only in
one  market.  As  a  result,  we  expect  that  exporting  firms  will  have  more  stable  capital
expenditures  compared  to  non-exporters.  We  also  predict  that  when  a  firm  becomes  an
exporter,  the  expectation  of  stable  future  cash  flows  and  the  information  signal  from
commencing exporting can lessen the severity of liquidity constraints.
We empirically examine these predictions on a stratified representative sample of the
Spanish manufacturing sector from 1990 to 1998. We compare the set of firms that exported
over the entire sample period with those that did not export over the entire sample period and
apply the methodology used to estimate the existence of firm liquidity constraints. We find
2
NOTE:  We  appreciate  helpful  comments  from  Tom  Pugel,  Rachelle  Sampson,  Rob  Salomon,  seminar
participants  at  Carnegie  Mellon  University,  Washington  University,  New  York  University,  the  Strategy
Research Forum, and the University of Minnesota.that exporters’ cash flows and capital investments are more stable than non-exporters’. In
addition, we find that liquidity constraints are less binding for exporters compared to non-
exporters. **The magnitude of these differences are economically important** We support
these  conclusions  by  finding  a  consistent  pattern  of  results  among  the  set  of  firms  that
switched their exporting status over the sample period.
The paper proceeds in the following manner. In the next section we further present
our reasoning of how exporting can affect firms’ capital investments. The following two
sections describe the data and specify the research design and methodology. The fifth section
presents the results and the final section concludes.
II. Exporting and Capital investment
Firm strategic decisions, such as capital investments, often involve the commitment
of financial resources in the short run on the expectation of future positive returns. If capital
markets are fully efficient and if information is freely available to all parties, then firms
should  be  able  to  find  external  sources  to  finance  profitable  investment  opportunities.
However, if these conditions do not hold, external financing becomes unavailable or costly
and firms’ ability to make capital investments becomes constrained by their cash flow. The
sensitivity of capital investment to firm cash flow is referred to as the existence of liquidity
constraints.
An  important  difference  between  exporters  and  non-exporters  is  that  exporters
potentially benefit from sales stabilization (Hirsch and Lev, 1970). Sales stabilization is the
diversification  benefit  that  exporters  realize  because  business  cycles  are  not  perfectly
correlated  across  national  markets.  Therefore,  firms  that  sell  products  in  more  than  one
country are more likely to have stable cash inflows compared to firms that operate in one
country. If firms’ abilities to make investments are constrained by their financial liquidity,
then cash flow stability allows them a greater ability to make investments – especially during
downturns in the domestic business cycle. 
In addition, we expect exporting to provide two informational advantages that can
mitigate  liquidity  constraints.  First,  the  expectation  of  more  stable  cash  flows  provides
greater  assurances  to  external  sources  of  funds  that  the  firm  will  be  able  to  service  its
obligations. This is because stable cash flows lower the chance that the firm will default
should the domestic economy, or any one of its markets, enter a downturn. Moreover, due to
the  existence  of  fixed  and  sunk  costs  to  commencing  exporting  as  argued  by  the  export
hysteresis  literature  (e.g.,  Baldwin,  1988;  Roberts  &  Tybout,  1994;  Campa,  1998),  firms
cannot  costlessly  or  instantaneously  commence  exporting  and  diversify  their  cash  flows
during downturns in the domestic business cycle. However, having covered the fixed costs to
commence exporting, firms can more easily shift sales to foreign markets during downturns
in  the  domestic  business  cycle.  Therefore,  exporting  provides  information  regarding  the
future stability of cash flows and increases the likelihood, everything else equal, that a firm
can access external financing sources. 
Second, exporting also sends a signal about firm “type.” Research to date shows that
exporters are more productive than non-exporters (e.g., Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Clerides,
Lach and Tybout, 1998; Aw and Huang, 1995; Delgado, Fariñas and Ruano, 1999). The
intuition underlying the productivity-export association is that exporters require some sort of
competitive  advantage  in  order  to  effectively  compete  with  indigenous  firms  in  foreign
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adaptation.  Assuming  that  firms  engage  in  exporting  with  the  expectation  of  generating
profits, commencing exporting signals that they possess sources of competitive advantage.
The possession of competitive advantage provides assurances that a company will be able to
service its external financing because it possesses the means to successfully compete in the
future.
To  summarize,  we  make  two  predictions  regarding  how  exporting  affects  firms’
capital investments. First, we expect that exporters will have more stable cash flows, and
hence  more  stable  capital  investments,  than  non-exporters.  This  stems  from  the
diversification  effect  that  exporters  enjoy  because  they  sell  in  multiple  national  markets
where the business cycles are not perfectly correlated. Second, we expect that the information
disseminated  upon  becoming  an  exporter  reduces  firms’  liquidity  constraints.  The
information is that the firm will have more stable expected future cash flows and that the firm
possesses some source of competitive advantage.
III. Data 
The data that we employ come from a longitudinal study of Spanish manufacturing
firms started in 1990 with data collected annually through 1998. This project is directed by
the Fundación Empresa Pública with financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Industry.
The  sample  is  representative  of  the  population  of  manufacturing  firms  in  the  Spanish
economy, although there is a difference in coverage depending on firm size. The sample
covers the population of Spanish manufacturing firms with 200 or more employees in 1990.
The sample also includes 4% of the population of firms with at least 10 employees but less
than 200 employees. Small firms that drop out of the original sample are replaced each year
by firms with similar characteristics from the population. The data consist of 2188 firms in
1990. Due to entry and exit, the resulting data set is an unbalanced panel of 3057 firms.
Spain  provides  an  appropriate  setting  to  test  the  relationships  that  we  wish  to
examine. First, a large proportion of firms in the sample are exporters. Just over 46 percent of
the  2188  firms  in  1990  reported  that  they  were  exporters.  Second,  there  is  little  direct
investment  by  Spanish  firms  in  this  sample,  making  exporting  the  primary  means  of
international diversification. Only 7 of these 2188 firms had foreign direct investments (0.03
percent of the sample). Third, during the sample period Spain went through an entire business
cycle. Figure 1 presents quarterly GDP growth in Spain between 1990 and 1998. The sample
period started with a growing economy, followed by a sharp recession in 1993 with negative
GDP growth continuing until the first quarter of 1994, and then a recovery during the last
years of the sample. This variance is useful in examining our arguments regarding sales
stability over the business cycle.
The  existence  of  an  entire  business  cycle  over  the  sample  period,  however,
introduces a concern when making the comparisons that we propose. Due to the business
cycle, a number of firms fail during the sample period. To limit the extent to which non-
survivor bias affects our comparison of exporters to non-exporters, we first limit the data to
the  set  of  firms  that  are  present  in  the  sample  for  each  year  between  1990  and  1998.
Therefore, all of the firms that we compare were able to survive the downturn in the Spanish
economy in the mid 1990s. This restricts the sample to 1010 firms (of the 2188 in the 1990
sample). We further restricted the sample to those firms that reported capital expenditures in
each year to further ensure comparability between groups of firms. This resulted in a usable
sample of 746 firms.
4IV. Research design and methodology
In its most simple form, the literature on investment liquidity constraints investigates
whether there exists a positive correlation between company cash flows (i.e., liquidity or
internal  financing)  and  investment.  Should  firms  be  liquidity  constrained,  we  expect  a
positive  correlation  because  companies  require  internal  financing  in  order  to  make
investments. Should firms not be liquidity constrained, we expect no correlation between
these  variables.  Companies  that  are  not  liquidity  constrained  can  go  to  external  finance
markets  whenever  they  have  an  appropriate  project  and  there  will  exist  no  correlation
between cash flow and firm investment.
A  concern  in  drawing  conclusions  from  this  relationship  is  that  cash  flow  can
capture effects other than liquidity constraints. In particular, cash flow might be correlated
with high growth and investment opportunity. Therefore, a positive relationship driven by
existing investment opportunities might be misinterpreted as a liquidity constraint.
To address this concern, the empirical literature has adopted two solutions. One has
been to identify, ex ante, groups of firms that should be differentially affected by liquidity
constraints and test if the sensitivity of investment to cash flow varies across these groups of
firms in the predicted manner. To date firms have been classified by dividend payout ratios
(Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988), bond rating (Whited, 1992), membership in a keiretsu
(Hoshi, Kasyap and Scharfstein, 1991), membership in a diversified firm (Lamont, 1997),
temporal macroeconomic-credit conditions (Gertler and Hubbard, 1988; Kashyap, Lamont
and  Stein,  1994),  and  firm  size  (Gertler  and  Gilchrist,  1994;  Gilchrist  and  Himmelberg,
1995).
The second solution, which has often been used in combination with the former, has
been to control for firm investment opportunities in a regression equation. Following Hayashi
(1982), a common approach has been to attempt to control for firms’ marginal q (i.e., the
marginal change in firm value from an increase in investment). Hayashi shows that under the
assumptions  of  perfect  competition,  constant  marginal  cost  of  investment,  and  efficient
financial  markets,  a  firm’s  marginal  q  equals  average  q  (or  Tobin’s  q).  Therefore,  many
studies have included Tobin’s q to empirically estimate the investment opportunity for a firm.
The test for the presence of liquidity constraints uses panel data and estimates a regression of
the general form:
Iit/Kit-1 = α + γπit/Kit-1 + βqit-1 + dt + εit [1]
Iit is investment by firm i in period t. Kit-1 is the replacement cost of capital for firm i
at the end of period t-1. πit is the cash flow of firm i at time t. qit-1 is Tobin’s q for firm i at
time t-1, and dt is a control for the period. An estimated coefficient of g greater than zero
rejects the null hypothesis that firms are not liquidity constrained. 
We  follow  a  similar  empirical  strategy.  However,  we  adapt  this  approach  in  a
number  of  ways  to  fit  the  characteristics  of  our  data.  First,  many  of  the  firm-year
observations in our sample show no capital investment. This reflects our ability to draw a
representative sample of manufacturing firms within Spain, and not having to rely on data
from  large  publicly  traded  companies.  Because  the  investment  variable  only  measures
investment and does not measure the possibility that a firm actively removes capital stock,
we have a censored dependent variable. Namely, under certain conditions we could imagine
that the appropriate firm strategy would be to actively reduce capital stock; however, a zero
level of capital investment would characterize this situation in these data. We therefore model
5investment  as  an  underlying  latent  variable  whose  value  we  do  not  observe  unless  it  is
positive.  Given  the  censored  nature  of  the  dependent  variable,  we  use  a  Tobit  model  to
estimate how the independent variables affect the dependent variable. 
Second, we do not use Tobin’s q to measure firms’ investment opportunities for the
following reasons. The assumptions under which marginal q equals average q (i.e., perfect
competition,  constant  marginal  cost  of  investment,  and  efficient  financial  markets)  are
unlikely to hold in our empirical context. For example, Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) find a
high  degree  of  synchronous  stock  price  movements  in  Spain,  which  suggests  limited
transparency and firm-specific information in the capital market. Moreover, conceptually one
of the key assumptions of this approach (i.e., the existence of efficient capital markets) is
exactly the proposition we are testing with respect to liquidity constraints; therefore, we do
not want to assume its existence in the formulation of our empirical approach. Finally, the
majority of firms in our sample are not publicly traded. As a result we are unable to measure
the  numerator  in  the  Tobin’s  q  formulation.  In  order  to  control  for  firm  investment
opportunities, we employ the following approach. We take advantage of the panel structure of
our data and, following Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), we use firm lagged margin and
sales growth to capture investment opportunities for each firm-year. In addition, we introduce
a firm random-effect in our estimation to further control for firm differences in investment
opportunity. 
Third, we scale investment and margin by current sales, not replacement value of
capital from the previous period. Scaling by sales allows us to sacrifice one less year in the
formulation of our tests. More importantly, due to the additional data required to calculate the
replacement value of capital, scaling by this variable reduces our sample size due to missing
data  values.  In  sensitivity  analyses,  our  results  do  not  qualitatively  differ  if  we  scale  by
replacement value of capital rather than sales.
Fourth, we use ∆GDPt to measure time period effects in some specifications. We use
the year dummy approach (i.e., including the vector dt) in other specifications.
Therefore, we estimate a random effects Tobit model of the following form:
I*it/Sit = α + γπit /Sit + β1πit-1/Sit-1 + β2Sit-1/Sit + δ∆GDPt + νi + υit [2]
where,
Iit/Sit = 0  if I*it/Sit<=0
[2a]
Iit/Sit = I*it/Sit if I*it/Sit>0 [2b]
We model the firm specific error component (i.e., νi ) as being drawn from a normal
distribution. We further analyze the existence of liquidity constraints by splitting the sample
among groups of firms that ex ante we believe to have different liquidity constraints, and test
whether  their  capital  investment  shows  different  sensitivity  to  cash  flow.  We  discuss  the
means by which we split the data after describing the data that we employ.
Variable definitions:
Our dependent variable is firm capital investment, which is defined as the level of
investment in plant and equipment for a given year. As previously discussed, we scale capital
investment by sales. We multiply the resulting ratio by 100 to present this variable as a
percentage. 
6The key independent variable that we use to measure the existence of the liquidity
constraint is cash flow. We measure cash flow as a firm’s margin, which is defined as value
of sales and changes in inventories minus the cost of goods, personnel, and subcontracted
services. We also scale this variable by sales and express it in percentages.
We measure exporting activity in two different ways. One is as a dummy variable
that indicates whether or not a firm exports in a given year. The other is the percentage of
total firm sales that stem from export sales. 
We use two lagged variables to proxy for marginal q (i.e., the set of investment
opportunities  available  to  the  firm).  These  variables  are  the  previous  year’s  margin  and
inverse sales growth (St-1/St). We use the inverse of sales growth because this formulation
employs the same denominator that we use to scale investment and cash flow. Because this
variable is inverse sales growth, smaller values indicate greater growth in sales. 
We  also  include  one  additional  control  variable,  the  level  of  firm  debt.  This  is
measured as the percentage of debt to total financing. Including this variable controls for the
possibility of binding borrowing constraints. Namely, firms with high levels of debt financing
might  be  unable  to  further  access  debt  markets  to  finance  investment.  However,  in  less
developed lending markets, this variable might measure access to debt instead of borrowing
constraint. Namely, firms with no or little debt have restricted access to debt markets.
To capture business cycle effects, we use the following methods. First, we measure
the change in inflation adjusted GDP from the previous year. These data are drawn from the
International Financial Statistics and  are  coded  in  trillions  of  1990  pesetas.  Second,  we
include a vector of dummy variables to capture year effects. 
Sub-sample definitions
Ex ante, we split the sample into sub-samples to perform the Tobit analysis. This
allows  us  to  better  assess  if  our  results  are  consistent  with  the  existence  of  liquidity
constraints versus alternative explanations.
Like most countries, many firms in Spain belong to larger business groups. We first
split the sample into firms that responded in the survey that they were “integrated into a
larger business group” and those that responded that they were not. We label these sub-
samples as affiliated and unaffiliated, respectively. Our motivation is to isolate firms that
have access to funds from other companies within their business group and are, therefore,
likely to face lower liquidity constraints. Hoshi et al. (1991) support this split of the sample
because they show that group firms in Japan were less liquidity constrained than independent
firms. 216 of the 746 firms in our sample belonged to larger business groups.
We  further  split  the  set  of  unaffiliated  firms  into  three  groups:  those  that  were
exporters for the entire panel, those that were non-exporters for the entire panel, and those
that switched exporting status during the panel. The number of firms in each sub-group is
respectively:  164,  201,  and  165.  We  perform  this  partitioning  to  isolate  the  liquidity
constraint of exporters and non-exporters. With this split, we can compare firms that were
exporters over 9 years to firms that were non-exporters over the same period. 
Should  we  find  differences,  we  can  then  examine  the  set  of  firms  that  changed
export status to aid our assessment of whether our findings actually represent differences
7associated with export status or other sources of firm heterogeneity. Moreover, we expect that
the important factors that initiate the switch between exporting status include exchange rate
changes and trade policy changes, which are largely exogenous to the firm.
Within the sub-sample of 165 firms that switch exporting status, we observe 279
separate  switches.  Therefore,  many  firms  change  their  exporting  status  more  than  once.
Although the median number of switches is one, the maximum is five and the mean is 1.69.
Of the 279 switches of export status, 175 correspond to non-exporters becoming exporters
and 104 correspond to exporters ceasing to export.
Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the four subgroups. Because we have panel
data, Table 1A presents descriptive statistics of the mean value of the variables for firms. The
upper number in each cell presents the mean value of the within-firm mean. Namely, we first
take the average value of the variable for a firm across the years in the sample. We then
average these values and present them in the table. The lower number, in brackets, presents
the mean value of the within-firm standard deviation.
We turn first to columns 1 and 2, which present the data on the unaffiliated non-
exporters and the unaffiliated exporters. With respect to variable means, exporters and non-
exporters  differ  significantly  in  size.  Consistent  with  the  existing  research,  we  find  that
exporters are larger than non-exporters. Exporters have on average 159 employees compared
to non-exporters, which have 28 employees. We find that the level of investment, margin, and
debt do not significantly differ between the two groups. However, we find that the average
within-firm standard deviations of investment, margin, and debt are significantly larger for
the non-exporters. Therefore, consistent with our expectation of sales stabilization, exporters
have less variance in their cash flow and investment compared to non-exporters.
Column 3 presents the data for the unaffiliated firms that switched export status over
the panel. In general, these firms have within-firm means and standard deviations that fall in-
between the exporters and non-exporters. This is to be expected should these firms be in
transition between the exporter and non-exporter groups. There are, however, two exceptions
worth highlighting. The switching firms are more profitable and have a higher proportion of
debt.  This  observation  would  be  consistent  with  fixed  and  sunk  costs  to  commencing
exporting.  Only  profitable  firms  or  firms  that  borrow  money  can  offset  the  costs  of
commencing to export.
Finally, column 4 presents the data for the affiliated companies. These firms are
much larger than the other firms in the sample. On average, these firms had an average
number  of  694  employees  over  the  sample  period.  We  find  that  these  firms  are  more
investment intensive than the unaffiliated firms. Moreover, they tend to be less profitable.
Table  1B  presents  the  means  and  standard  deviations  for  all  of  the  firm-level
variables that we employ in the regression analyses. The descriptive statistics are for the
pooled cross-section. The sample sizes in this table represent the usable sample in the Tobit
analyses. Due to missing values in the independent variables, we do not estimate balanced
panels. The data item that caused the greatest reduction due to missing values was the debt
variable. We found results that are consistent with the ones that we report if we dropped this
variable and increased the sample size. 
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observations where investment (i.e., the dependent variable) equals zero. This proportion is
largest for the unaffiliated non-exporters (32 percent), lower for the unaffiliated exporters (13
percent), and in-between these observations for the unaffiliated switchers (23 percent). Only
three percent of the observations for the affiliated firms have zero investment in a year. Given
the  large  proportion  of  zeros  in  all  categories  except  affiliated  firms,  we  approach  the
estimation with the Tobit estimator. In sensitivity analysis that we do not report, we find
results  that  are  consistent  with  those  that  we  present  using  GLS  with  fixed  or  random
effects (1).
V. Tobit results
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 present the Tobit estimates for the unaffiliated non-
exporting firms and the unaffiliated exporting firms, respectively. The variable of greatest
interest is Margin/Sales. We find a positive significant coefficient estimate of this variable for
the non-exporters and a non-significant effect of this variable for the exporters. Moreover, the
magnitude of the marginal effect on the underlying latent variable is approximately six times
greater for the non-exporters (2). This pattern of results is consistent with the non-exporters
being liquidity constrained and the exporters not being liquidity constrained.
Column 3 of Table 2 combines these two sub samples in order to test the difference
in the coefficient estimates by interacting the exporting dummy variable with Margin/Sales
and DGDP. In column 3 we find a positive and significant effect of Margin/Sales, which is
the marginal effect for the non-exporters. In addition, the magnitude of this effect is very
similar  to  the  one  in  column  1.  We  also  find  a  negative  and  significant  effect  of
Export*Margin/Sales in column 3, indicating that the exporters’ investments are significantly
less sensitive to their cash flows. The resulting marginal effect for the exporters is 0.009.
The effect of the sensitivity of investment to cash flow is economically significant
for non-exporters. The estimated elasticity of investment/sales to changes in cash flow is 0.3.
This implies that a positive shock of one standard deviation in cash-flow (a 12 percentage
point increase in margin/sales) results in an increase of 1 percentage point of investment/sales
greater than that implied for the firm if the firm were not liquidity constrained. Given that the
average investment to sales ratio for these firms is 3.3, the additional volatility in investment
due to one standard deviation in cash flow is on the order of 30 percent.
We also find a positive and significant effect of the Export variable in column 3,
although  there  was  no  difference  between  exporters’  and  non-exporters’  average  capital
investment  in  the  summary  statistics.  The  significant  coefficient  estimate  suggests  that
exporters have higher levels of capital investment once we control for the other influences in
the Tobit specification.
Turning to the control variables in columns 1 and 2, we find that both sets of firms’
investments are sensitive to underlying growth in the Spanish economy. The positive and
significant  coefficient  estimates  of  ∆GDP  in  both  columns  indicate  such.  Although  the
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(1) Due to the way we split the data, some of our specifications are inestimable with fixed effects.
(2) Given that our dependent variable is censored, we focus on the marginal effect of the underlying latent
variable, which is the coefficient estimate.magnitude and significance of the coefficient estimate for the exporting firms is greater than
the non-exporters in column 1 versus column 2, the coefficient estimates are not significantly
different as indicated by the interaction term Export*∆GDP in column 3.
We find a similar pattern of results across columns 1 and 2 with respect to lagged
margin. We include the lagged margin variable to control for investment opportunities. We
find that past margin increases investment and the magnitude of the effect is larger for non-
exporters. Also across columns 1 and 2, we find positive coefficient estimates of Debt/Total
assets. The positive coefficient estimate does not suggest the existence of binding borrowing
constraints. It suggests that there might be differences in access to debt. Firms that have
access to debt can invest more than firms that cannot access debt. This is consistent with the
existence of borrowing constraints. Finally, we find that sales growth increases investment
for non-exporters. However, it decreases investment for exporters. 
All told, the results in columns 1 through 3 are consistent with exporters being less
liquidity constrained compared to non-exporters. To provide further insight into the validity
of the pattern of findings, we examine the extent of liquidity constraint for the affiliated firms
in column 4. As expected, we do not find evidence of liquidity constraint as evidenced by the
significant  negative  coefficient  estimate  of  cash  flow.  The  negative  estimate  would  be
consistent with sharing of cash among business group members where struggling firms are
provided with cash inflows from group firms and profitable firms have cash funneled to more
needy  group  members.  The  negative  coefficient  estimate  is  not  novel  in  the  liquidity
constraint literature. Hoshi et al. (1991) find such a relationship for the group of firms that are
subsidiaries of larger Japanese keiretsu. Therefore, we find that investment sensitivity to cash
flow varies across these three groups of firms in a way that is consistent with the existence of
liquidity constraints.
Table  3  replicates  the  specifications  found  in  Table  2  for  the  unaffiliated  non-
exporters, unaffiliated exporters, and affiliated firms. The difference is that we remove the
DGDP variable and include the vector of year dummy variables in order to more flexibly
estimate  the  year-to-year  effects.  Since  we  include  a  constant,  1991  is  the  omitted  case.
Across the three columns in Table 3, we find that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow is
very similar in magnitude and significance level to that in column 2. The control variables
also exhibit very consistent results.
We further explore the sensitivity of investment for these groups of firms to the
domestic  business  cycle  by  using  the  year  dummy  coefficient  estimates.  The  dummy
variables capture the year-by-year influences after controlling for the firm variables in the
equation and the random effect. In Figure 2, we graph the year effects for each group of
firms (3). Comparing the three graphs in Figure 2, we see that the unaffiliated non-exporters
show much more variability of investment in a manner related to the domestic business cycle,
albeit with a two-year delay. The unaffiliated exporters show some sensitivity to the recession
in 1993 and then large increases as the economy recovers. The graph for the affiliated firms
shows the least sensitivity to the domestic business cycle. Although the curve declines in
1992, it stays relatively constant after that. To summarize these results, the sensitivity to the
business  cycle,  once  controlling  for  firm-effects,  appears  greater  for  unaffiliated  non-
exporters than unaffiliated exporters, and greater for these firms than for affiliated firms. This
is consistent with a smoothing of investment facilitated by sales stabilization.
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(3) We  base  the  graph  values  on  the  all  coefficient  estimates,  not  the  just  the  ones  that  test  significantly
different from zero.Although the evidence appears consistent with differences in liquidity constraints, it
is possible that other firm differences, for which we are not controlling, drive the relationship
between the sensitivity of investment and cash flow. Such variables could include economy-
wide parameters such as exchange rates and trade integration of the economy or firm-specific
characteristics  such  as  productivity,  location,  or  managerial  efficiency.  The  presence  of
economy-wide  variables  should  not  result  in  any  bias  as  long  as  the  effects  that  these
variables have on investment is the same for all firms in the sample. However, firm specific
characteristics  are  likely  to  affect  the  investment  behavior  of  firms  differently.  For  this
reason,  we  examine  the  group  of  unaffiliated  firms  that  switch  their  exporting  status.
Examining the sensitivity of liquidity constraints to the change in export status allows us to
assess if the difference is associated with the change in export status, which is what we argue,
versus differences in firms’ characteristics that we have as yet not controlled for.
Table  4  presents  the  analyses  of  the  unaffiliated  firms  that  switch  export  status.
Column  1  presents  our  standard  liquidity  constraint  estimation  specification.  Column  2
presents  the  same  specification  with  the  interaction  terms  Export*Margin/Sales  and
Export*∆GDP. We present the results in column 1 in order to provide the comparison case to
column  2,  which  tests  our  arguments.  The  addition  of  the  interaction  terms  significantly
increases the explanatory power of the model as indicated by the incremental χ2 test. In
column 2, we find that the main effect of Margin/Sales is positive and significant. This is
consistent with the argument that these firms exhibit liquidity constraints in the periods when
they  do  not  export.  The  coefficient  estimate  of  Export*Margin/Sales  is  negative  and
significant. This indicates that these firms are significantly less liquidity constrained in the
periods in which they exported. The marginal effect of Export*Margin/Sales in the export
periods is 0.038. In addition, the non-significant main effect of Export suggests that firms do
not change the level of capital expenditure based on their export status. To summarize, in the
sample of firms that switch their exporting status, we are able to replicate the pattern of
liquidity constraints found in the samples of exporters and non-exporters.
Discussion
We argue that exporters will have less binding liquidity constraints compared to non-
exporting firms. The results we present are consistent with this argument in that we find non-
exporter’s  capital  investments  to  be  significantly  more  sensitive  to  their  cash  flows  than
exporters’. As with all studies that employ this approach to estimate liquidity constraints, it is
possible that the relationship between cash flow and investment might capture effects other
than liquidity constraints. 
In  the  context  of  our  study,  we  undertake  the  following  efforts  to  mitigate  the
possibility of these alternative explanations. First, we include a set of variables in each Tobit
regression model to control for investment opportunities. Moreover, we include firm random
effects to capture sources of firm heterogeneity that we do not include in the regression
model. We chose to include random effects rather than fixed effects due to the fact that we
are working with a representative sample of firms which is not exhaustive of the population
from which we will want to draw inferences and conclusions. Our results are not sensitive to
the inclusion of fixed rather than random effects. Second, we split the sample into three
groups of firms that we believe ex ante will have differing liquidity constraints: unaffiliated
non-exporters, unaffiliated exporters, and affiliated firms. We find a pattern of relationship
between  cash  flow  and  investments  across  these  three  groups  that  is  consistent  with  the
existence of liquidity constraints.
11Third, we examine the sensitivity of cash flow to investment in a sub-sample of
firms that changed their exporting status over the sample period. This is an important test
because the previous efforts could not rule out that there was some unmeasured underlying
difference among the groups of firms. However, tracking firms that switched groups over the
sample period allows us to better assess if the difference between exporters and non-exporters
is associated with the switch. Due to the nature of group definitions in many other liquidity
constraint studies, it has not been possible to have firms switch among groups. For example,
there is no variation in keiretsu groups in Hoshi et al. As a result, we believe the ability to
examine the group of firms that switch export status is a strength of our study. When we
examine  the  firms  that  switch  export  status,  we  find  results  that  are  consistent  with  our
expectations. The sensitivity to cash flow lessens when firms become exporters. This test
helps reduce the possible alternative explanations to effects that change in conjunction with
export status changes.
We  perform  one  final  analysis  to  assess  if  the  change  in  liquidity  constraint  is
associated with the switch in exporting status. We examine the set of unaffiliated exporters
and assess if investment sensitivity to cash flow is a function of the percentage of firm sales
from exports. In results that we do not report in this paper, we find that investment sensitivity
to  cash  flow  does  not  vary  by  the  percentage  of  export  sales  although  the  coefficient
estimates are signed as we would expect. We also re-examined the specifications that we
presented in Table 4 by replacing the export dummy variable with the percentage of firm
sales from exports. We find continued support for the conclusions that we draw. However, the
results are not as strong as when we use the export dummy variable. Combined, these results
suggest that the switch to exporting is what drives the results rather than changes in the level
of exporting, given that a firm is already an exporter. This is consistent with our arguments of
why an exporter would have less binding liquidity constraints versus a non-exporter. Finally,
we replicated all of our results normalizing the investment, margin and sales variables by the
replacement  value  of  capital  rather  than  sales.  Although  this  decreases  our  sample  size
significantly due to missing observations in the replacement value of capital variable, we find
results that are consistent with those reported above.
Before concluding, we want to highlight the benefits and limitations of our sample
and its ability to contribute new insights to the literature on liquidity constraints. We believe
that our sample offers many advantages. First, our data is based on a representative sample of
the Spanish manufacturing sector. It is not limited to publicly traded firms. Thus, we include
in our sample a substantial number of firms that do not appear in many other studies of this
topic. For example, while previous studies have split the sample by firm size to assess the
potential for liquidity constraints, our sample includes firms so small that they would not
have been sampled in previous studies. Second, we examine these issues in an economy
where the level of firm-specific information on publicly traded companies is less than in the
United States. Third, we are able to observe switching over time in export status. These
characteristics of our sample potentially heighten the ability to observe the relationship we
explore because they introduce variation in the characteristics of firms in an institutional
environment  that  make  the  underlying  drivers  more  pronounced.  Moreover,  these
characteristics aid our ability to rule out alternative explanations. Nevertheless, our sample
also has important limitations. Most important, we have excluded from the sample exiting
firms.  Most  of  the  firms  that  exit  are  small  firms,  with  limited  growth  and  investment
potential (Delgado et al. 1999). These firms are the most likely to be liquidity constrained.
Moreover, because non-exporters are smaller firms these firms are likely to be non-exporters.
Therefore, to the extent that the exclusion of these firms biases the results, the bias should be
towards rejecting the presence of liquidity constraints. Finally, given the specifics of our data
and the Spanish situation, we recognize that our results might not be fully generalizable
outside of this context.
12VI. Conclusion
To date, the evidence suggests that exporting is an outcome. For instance, it appears
that productive firms become exporters and this drives the correlation between exporting and
productivity. This suggests that the causality goes from an existing firm characteristic, being
productive, to a strategic outcome, exporting.
We, however, argued that exporting has also an important impact on certain firm
behavior such as capital investment. In particular, we expect that the stabilization of cash
flows that results from selling in countries with imperfectly correlated business cycles allows
exporting  firms  to  have  more  stable  capital  investments.  Moreover,  we  expect  that
commencing exporting signals information that mitigates liquidity constraints faced by the
firm. This information includes the expectation of more stable future cash flows and the
indication that the firm possesses some source of competitive advantage.
We find evidence, using a sample of Spanish firms followed over nine years, that
exporters’ capital investments and cash flows have lower variation than non-exporters. In
addition, we find that after controlling for many firm factors, non-exporters’ investments tend
to vary more with the domestic business cycle, although there appears to be some lag. Most
interestingly,  we  find  evidence  that  exporters  are  less  liquidity  constrained  than  non-
exporters. 
Our results highlight that exporting is more than an outcome. They suggest that
exporting allows firms to undertake actions that they might otherwise be unable to do. In this
paper, we show evidence that exporters have advantages over non-exporters when financing
their  capital  investments.  This  result  has  important  implications  when  considering  the
strategic value of exporting for a firm. The potential benefit in the ability to make future
capital  investments  highlights  a  payoff  that  many  potential  exporters  might  not  consider
when assessing the return associated with the costs of commencing exporting. Finally, our
results suggest that exporters might be able to use their advantage in access to financing for
capital investment, at the expense of their domestic competitors, to improve their competitive
position whenever local market conditions are weak.
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15Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
A. Mean values of within-firm means and mean values of within-firm standard
deviations [in brackets]
1. Unaffiliated 2. Unaffiliated 3. Unaffiliated 4. Affiliated 
Non-exporters Exporters Switchers 
Investmentt/Salest 3.23 3.44 3.33 4.42
(percentages)  [4.24]  [3.11]  [3.53]  [3.65]  
Margint/Salest 9.75 10.74 11.08 9.25
(percentages)  [9.47]  [7.48]  [8.91] [7.87]  
Debtt/Total assetst 52.42 54.12 58.31 55.07
(percentages) [12.79] [10.68]  [11.37]  [10.29]  
Employees 26.89 159.02 59.33 694.18
(Number)  [4.34]  [21.55]  [11.21]  [123.26]  
Sales 465919.70 2462807.00 1311747.00 1.74x107
(1000’s pesetas)  [126785.10]  [584252.90]  [287647.50]  [4523269]        
n  201  164  165  216  
B. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for panel 
1. Unaffiliated  2. Unaffiliated 3. Unaffiliated 4. Affiliated
Non-exporters   Exporters   Switchers 
Investmentt/Salest 3.32 3.45 3.36 4.46
(7.32)  (4.94)  (5.65)  (7.14)  
Proportion of obs. 
with zero investmentt 0.32  0.13  0.23  0.03
Margint/Salest 9.70 10.72 11.16 10.14
(12.72)  (10.67)  (14.10)  (12.42)  
Salest-1/Salest 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.95
(0.41)  (0.22)  (0.25)  (0.29) 
Margint-1/Salest-1 9.94 11.37 11.62 10.29
(13.55)  (11.13)  (14.40)  (13.30)  
Debtt/Total assetst 52.04 54.05 58.02 54.34
(24.63)  (22.71)  (23.14)  (22.25) 
Employees  27.72 160.33 60.10 647.12
(48.90)  (284.34)  (148.19)  (1468.48)       
n  1516  1298  1278  1624  
16Table 2. Dependent variable: Investment/sales
Tobit with firm random-effects (t-statistics in parentheses)
1. Unaffiliated 2. Unaffiliated 3. Unaffiliated 4. Affiliated 
Non-exporters Exporters Exporters  and 
non-exporters 
Margin/Sales  0.084*** 0.014 0.081*** -0.035**
(3.71) (0.87)  (4.57)  (1.86)  
∆GDP  0.438* 0.780*** 0.456** 0.314**
(1.63)  (5.21) (2.17)  (1.66)
Export    1.547***
(2.47)   
Export*Margin/Sales    -0.072***
(2.59)   
Export*∆GDP    0.297
(0.99)         
Salest-1/Salest -1.510* 1.262** (1.80)  -0.479
(1.52) (0.61)(0.90)  0.374 (0.61)
Margint-1/Salest-1 0.070*** 0.023* 0.054*** 0.029**
(3.37) (1.51)  (4.10)  (1.72)  
Debtt/Total assetst 0.021** 0.012* 0.019*** 0.006
(1.67)  (1.43) (2.46)  (0.55) 
Constant  -0.837 -0.286 -1.011 3.33***
(0.61)  (0.30)  (1.22) (3.43)        
ρ 0.151***  0.244***  0.172***  0.138***  
χ2 test of the 
coefficients 42.71*** 35.72 82.34*** 8.37
n  1516  1298  814  1624  
Number of firms  201  164  365  216  
* p< 0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (one-tailed tests)
17Table 3. Dependent variable: Investment/sales 
Tobit with firm random-effects
1. Unaffiliated 2. Unaffiliated 3. Affiliated
Non-exporters Exporters 
Margin/Sales  0.082*** 0.020 -0.033**
(3.61)  (1.18)  (1.77)       
Salest-1/Salest -1.903** 1.291** 0.019
(1.77) (1.81)  (0.03)  
Margint-1/Salest-1 0.070*** 0.028** 0.020
(3.34) (1.88)  (1.21)
Debtt/Total assetst 0.022** 0.013** 0.002
(1.72)  (1.57)  (0.19)  
Constant  0.828 -0.196 7.310***
(0.61) (0.85)  (7.05) 
1992  -0.881 0.304 -2.730***
(0.91)  (0.56)  (4.15) 
1993 -1.234 -0.414 -3.646***
(1.25)  (0.76)  (5.46)  
1994  -1.321* 0.416 -3.819***
(1.35)  (0.75)  (5.73)  
1995  -2.465** 0.422 -3.754***
(2.48)  (0.77)  (5.70)  
1996  -0.652 0.441 -3.167***
(0.50)  (0.81)  (4.82) 
1997  0.450 1.090** -3.691***
(0.46) (2.01)  (5.63)  
1998  -0.074 2.79*** -3.270***
(0.08) (5.17)  (4.99)      
ρ 0.153***  0.245***  0.147***  
χ2 test of the coefficients  52.57***  54.97*** 58.33***       
n  1516  1298  1624  
Number of firms  201  164  216  
(t-statistics in parentheses)
* p< 0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (one-tailed tests)
18Table 4. Dependent variable: Investment/sales 
Tobit with firm random-effects
1. Unaffiliated 2. Unaffiliated
Switchers Switchers
Margin/Sales  0.070*** 0.110***
(3.91)  (4.44)  
∆GDP  0.579*** 0.892***
(2.95)  (3.27)  
Export   0.526
(0.70)  
Export*Margin/Sales   -0.072***
(2.33)  
Export*∆GDP   -0.513
(1.27)      
Salest-1/Salest -1.470** -1.404**
(1.72)  (1.65)  
Margint-1/Salest-1 0.035** 0.035**
(2.31)  (2.28)  
Debtt/Total assetst -0.005 -0.004
(0.51)  (0.41) 
Constant  2.032** 1.587
(1.71)  (1.27)      
ρ 0.199***  0.208***  
χ2 test of the coefficients  45.01***  57.36***  
Incremental χ2(3) 12.35***  
n  1278  1278  
Number of firms  165  165  
(t-statistics in parentheses)
* p< 0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (one-tailed tests)
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